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In recent years there has been increased interest in the measurement and
evaluation of program effects. In the economics literature the primary focus
has been on addressing potential ecoonometric issues such as those arising if programs
are not randomly placed with respect to the outcome variables of interest or if the
program importantly influences the composition of the resulting population (see., e.g.
Pitt and Rosenzweig 1989; Pitt, Rosenzweig and Hassan 1993; Gertler, Molyneaux and
Hatmaji 1993).  An alternative, and more straightforward approach is to evaluate the
effects of an experimentally introduced intervention which, in principle, provides a
direct estimate of the effects of the program intervention but may provide little insight
into underlying mechanisms and therefore into potential long-run effects of the
program. 
In this paper, I argue that the approaches are complementary. In order to
illustrate this point I provide three examples from rural areas of developing countries.
These examples show that  (1)  inferences about program effects based on treatment
comparison data can be misleading if fertility selection is ignored; (2) that insight into
the long-run effects of a program can be gained even with a relatively short experiment;
and (3) it is possible to distinguish the mechanism through which health programs
affect schooling even when the program affects the health of all household members.
II. Theoretical Framework
The theoretical framework for this paper is provided by a dynamic stochastic





makes choices sequentially that influence household size (through fertility and
mortality) as well as the consumption and human capital (health and schooling) of its
members. In particular,
where c   and  h  are the consumption and human capital, respectively of individuals it it
age i at time t and n  is the number of individuals age i at time t. Stocks are updated in it
a straightforward fashion. If s  is per capita human capital investment in those aged i at it
time t and d  is the number of deaths at time t, then we may write it
and
for all i>0. It is assumed that d =d(h ,n ,0), that is  the number of deaths of those aged it i it it
i at time t depends on human capital, the number of individuals and a household
endowment; I also assume that deaths in period t are resolved after that period’s
human capital investment decision is made. The number of aged 0 individuals in the
household is assumed to be determined by a simple reproduction function that depends
on fecundity ￿ and contraceptive use z  in that period t
Finally,  I assume that there is no saving in any period so that the single period budget3
(5)
(6)
constraint may be written:
where w  is the wage per efficiency unit, where human capital is equated with relative it
efficiency in the labor market. The wages, prices of consumption p , human capital ct
investment p t, and contraception p  are assumed to be distributed independently  sz t
over time.  Under these conditions, it is well known that households decisions in each
period (as well as outcomes that result from household decisions in that period such as
mortality) can be written as a function of the number and human capital of household
members by age at that time as well as contemporaneous wages and prices. Thus we
may write:
for K={c ,s ,z ,d , n ).  it it t it+1 0t
There are two important features of equation (6). First, it is in principal
something that can be estimated directly. Although there are important econometric
problems that arise because of the fact that many of the state variables are chosen by
the household and thus are likely to be correlated with ￿ and 0, which will in general
be unobservable, these problems can be dealth with through a combination of fixed-
effects methods and instrumental variables. Second, these decision rules capture
complex relationships between, for example, the history of past prices and current
decisions in a relatively simple way: the past history of prices only influences current
decisions to the extent that it affects the current stock of individuals and their human
capital.Both of these features will be incorporated in the examples discussed below.      Menken and Phillips (1988) provide a lucid overview of the principle
1
demographic insights gained from analyses of data from this area. 
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III. Illustrations
A. Fertility Selection and Health Program Effects 
The first example comes from the Matlab study area in rural Bangladesh, which
has been the sight of a number of important health and demographic studies since
1966.   Of particular interest in this regard is the maternal child health and family
1
planning project (MCH-FP) that was set up in 1978 on a treatment-control basis.
Although logistical and other considerations precluded the random allocation of
programs to households, a careful selection of treatment and comparison areas 
provides an imperfect but reasonable approximation to a true experimental program. 
The results from Matlab are widely thought to provide good evidence that a
carefully designed and administered program to deliver family planning services can
have an important impact on fertility in a low-income rural setting (Menken and Phillips
1990). The program involves frequent household visits by female family planning
workers providing in-home access to a variety of contraceptive methods along with
careful management of side effects. Starting from the 1982, maternal and child health
services were integrated into the program in subregions of the intervention area. The
comparison area received regular government services, which involved the use of poorly
supervised male workers and a limited menu of methods that were inconsistently
available.  While some methods would have been available at subsidized prices through
local clinics and and/or pharmacies in the comparison area, restrictions on travel for
women in this conservative, largely muslim, area substantially limited access to the
most popular methods such as injectables.   5
Following the introduction of the Matlab project in 1978, contraceptive
prevalence rates in the treatment area increased from 7 percent to 20 percent and
reached 33 percent after 18 months of project intervention. A new plateau of 45
percent was reached approximately six years following the introduction of the program
(Phillips et al. 1988) and the level was 57.6 percent in 1990. The contraceptive
prevalence rate in the comparison area was only 15.8 percent in 1984 and had risen to
27.9 percent in 1990 (Keonig et al. 1991). Changes in fertility rates were equally
dramatic. While the total fertility rate in the treatment area before the start of the
program was 6.2 percent lower than that in the comparison area, this difference is not
significant at the 5 percent level. The year following the introduction of the program
fertility was 25 percent lower in the treatment than in the comparison area with
differences of 48.7 and 55.6 percent in the 35-39 and 40-44 year age groups respectively
(Phillips et al. 1981, p23). 
While these dramatic effects of the program on fertility are well known, it is
perhaps less well known that the measured effects of the treatment program on
mortality were relatively small until 1982 when an intensive maternal and child health
program including measles immunization was increasingly integrated into the
treatment area.  It is this issue that I consider below: in particular, I ask whether the
lack of a substantial emerging differential in mortality reflects the fact that the
intensive family planning services and low-level maternal and child-health services
(including tetanus toxoid) had little impact on mortality risk for children.
A potential competing hypothesis is that the composition of births was      See Pitt and Rosenzweig (1989) for a technical discussion of fertility
2
selection as well as more sophisticated methodologies for addressing the
problem than that used in this paper. 





importantly influenced by the introduction of the treatment program.  The idea is
2
simple: if those who chose to make use of the family planning program were, for some
reason, on average of lower mortality than those who did not make use of the program,
then one might see little differential in average mortality rates for treatment and
control areas after the introduction of the program even if the effects of the program
on a particular child’s mortality risk  were quite large. 
In the context of the above theoretical model, this issue is most easily addressed
by allowing for women-specific heterogeneity in mortality risk and assuming that
fertility is decreasing in the stock of surviving older children.  The idea is simply that
3
for a given level of fertility high risk women will be less likely  to make use of family
planning services if they become available because they will have fewer surviving
children at each point in time. I use a simplified  version of the decision rule (6) in
which the cost of contraception and human capital (i.e., health care) are prohibitive (i.e.,
effectively infinite) in the first period and differ by area in the second period and the
resulting childbearing decision rules and mortality outcomes may be written :
and      In this case prohibitive means so large that it does not influence the
4




respectively, where 0 is given a subscript j to indicate that there is permanent variation
across women in mortality risk for her children. Under these conditions it is easily seen
that the death rate in the second period among women with a birth (n >0) may be 02
written
where the inequality (equality) is strict if p  is not (is) prohibitive:  thus even if the z2
4
treatment program lowers p , mortality in the second period in the treatment area may s2
not be lower than that in the comparison area which will continue to have a mortality
rate of E(0).  It is also easily seen that the difference (d -d )  =-1/p  measures the 02 01 s2
reduction in the cost of human capital directly: thus a comparison in the mortality
change for women in the treatment area who have births in both periods  with that for
women in the comparison area will provide an accurate picture of how much the
program reduced mortality of a particular child. 
An illustration of this point is provided in Table 1. In this case all births over the
period 1974-1982 from the Matlab vital registration records are linked to deaths in the
first year of life as well as socio-economic information from the 1974 census. We first
carry out a logisitic regression of the probability of death on a treatment area dummy,
year of birth and an interaction of the treatment area with the dummy indicating the      The reason the sample size is so small is that the fixed-effects logit
5
procedure only makes use of women who (1) had a birth both before and after
and (2) experienced a death in one period but not in the other. Thus despite
the fact that fewer cases available, the number of deaths represented is
somewhat smaller than is the case for columns (1) and (2) but not
substantially so. 
8
birth was after 1978; this latter variable picks up births that took place in the treatment
area after the introduction of the MCH-FP program.  The second column includes these
variables as well as a number of socio-economic measures. The main point to be noticed
is that the treatment area-interaction is positive and not significant--suggesting that the
program had little effect on infant mortality and that controlling for a few observed
characteristics does not change this basic conclusion.
The third column in Table 2 contains fixed-effects logit (Chamberlain 1988)
estimates that condition on women who had a birth both before and after 1978. This
estimator, given our model, provides an accurate picture of the true effect of the
treatment program on infant mortality.  The results are striking--there is a strong and
5
significant effect of the treatment program on mortality. The coefficent of .21, given the
average infant morality of 110/1000 in the data, implies a  reduction in mortality of
approximately 18%. While given the simplicity of the specification, one ought to be
cautions about direct interpretation of this figure, the main prediction of the model--
that selectivity may be resulting in an underestimate of the effects of the treatment
program on mortality--is strongly supported. 
B. Inferring Long-run Effects from Short-run Data
The second example also focusses on the MCH-FP program in Matlab--in
particular it explores the question of whether the treatment program has had an effect
on the level of schooling provided to children and if so what the longer-run      This section summarizes Foster and Roy (1993).
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implications of the program for changes in levels of schooling are likely to be.   
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Although it has long been thought that family planning programs in developing
countries can have an impact on human capital formation and thus be a contributor to
the process of economic growth, the evidence has thus far been extremely thin. Despite
the negative cross-sectional relationship that is generally observed between family size
and educational attainment, it is not obvious that the inability to control reproduction
is an important barrier to increased education in low-income countries.  Researchers in
this area have been troubled by a number of econometric problems including the
endogeneity of program placement, the absence of direct measures of the costs and
returns to childbearing, and the long period that must be used to relate changes in
reproductive behavior to changes in human capital formation.
Moreover, in part because of the difficulty associated with obtaining direct
estimates of the cost of fertility control, little is known about the relative importance of
different mechanisms underlying the schooling-fertility tradeoff. For example, if
schooling costs are  high and families cannot transfer resources across time then a
decrease in the cost of fertility control may affect schooling by leading to a reduction in
the number of children who are school-aged at any particular point in time.
Alternatively, if school-aged children provide an important source of income then an
increase in the number of school-aged children might increase the level of schooling
provided to each.  In this case, a decrease in the cost of fertility control might increase
schooling through a reduction in the number of preschool children who increase




on the part of older siblings. A similar point can be made with respect to the
implications of the schooling-fertility tradeoff for allocations of schooling by sex. Girls
may receive lower schooling than boys because (1) parents perceive that the returns to
schooling for girls are low  (2) households with school-aged girls may be more likely to
have young children in the household   
To illustrate these issues I again turn to a simplified model in which there are
two childbearing ages. I also assume that each period is approximately 8 years in the
length so that the schooling of first "batch" of children is determined simultaneously
with the number of children in the second "batch". Thus childbearing in the first period
is 
and the schooling provided to those children is
where the negative coefficient on n  reflects the assumption that an increase in the 1t
number of school aged children may decrease the average schooling recieved by each
and the negative coeficient on p  reflects the fact that the cost of fertility control will zt+1
influence childbearing, which will also may influence the level of schooling provided to
older children. The number of children born in the second period will also reflect these
variables:11
(13)
and they will be provided with a level of schooling:
It should be clear that given parameter estimates for each of these equations (or a
generalizaiton of these equations to more than two periods) it would be possible to
determine pattern of schooling and human capital for any possible history of prices,
and thus to determine the long-run effects, for example, of a permanent reduction in
the cost of family planning services. 
One to the estimation of the parameters in equations 9-13 would of course be to
solve them completely and thus to obtain equations relating schooling, say, in period
t+2 to the full history of past prices (in this special case prices in periods 1 and 2). The
problem with this approach is that it demands a great deal of the data--one needs
access to information on the cost of contraception over the full history of a woman’s
reproductive career. In Foster and Roy (1993) it is suggested that a more attractive
procedure is to estimates these equations directly, in which case one needs only
information on subset of a woman’s reproductive career (i.e., about 8 years) as well as
the stocks of children she has in each period. 
The estimates of these equations were obtained from a combination of the 1974
and 1982 censuses from Matlab and the 1990 KAP survey. The KAP survey is of a
stratified sample of 8500 currently married, reproductive-aged women with
approximately equal numbers of women in the treatment and comparison areas
(Keonig et al 1991).  Included in this latter survey is information on educational
attainment of children and distance to school. The sample used in the analysis is made
up of women from the 1990 survey along with all women of reproductive ages from the12
1974 and 1982 censuses, who were, at the time of the respective census, resident in one
of the 67 villages that were part of the sampling frame of the 1990 survey. While the
1990 survey contains information on the ages, sexes and educational attainment of
children under the age of 15 at the time of the survey, the censuses may only be used
to construct such measures for those who remain resident in the study area.
Fortunately, the vital registration data indicate that migration for either boys and gilrs
is unlikely before this age. Fertility (net of mortality) is measured by the number of
children under the age of eight in the appropriate census and schooling is measured by
years of completed schooling at the date of the census.
Estimates of the education and fertility decision rules are presented in Table 2.
First, the fertility decision rules are much as might be expected: each additional male
child over the age of 8 results in a reduction of approximately .8 in the average number
of children born in a given 8-year interval. The results are quite different for girls, a
result that likely reflects parental aspirations for male children: an extra girl child
results in on only a .07 reduction in subsequent childbearing--thus a woman with male
school-aged (and older) children is more likely to limit her fertility than a woman with
only female school-aged and older children.  Third, the greater the level of schooling of
older children in the household, the lower the level of fertility that is chosen. And most
importantly, the treatment-year interactions indicate a substantial reduction in fertility
by 1982 (4-years after the introduction of the program) and an even larger effect by
1990--given the average level of fertility in this population these results correspond to
approximately a 25% decline in fertility in the treatment relative to the comparision
area. . 
The education decision rules are perhaps more unexpected. In contrast to the      Given the results from the previous section, it might be argued that this
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effect operates through the increased health of children in the treatment
area. Foster and Roy (1990) construct a test using an indirectly calculated
measure of fecundity that suggests that the fertility effect is dominant. In
addition, results from the next section (from the Philippines) provide no
support for the idea that the schooling of older children is importantly
influeced by the health of the younger children.
      This net consumption may be in the form of nutrition, for example, as
8
well as through the need to provide pre-school children with childcare.
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usual assumption that increases in the number of school-aged children results in lower
schooling, we find here that an extra male child actually increases the average schooling
of his siblings (regardless of sex) by .84 years, given that the mean level of schooling in
this population in 1982 was only 2.4, this difference is of some importance.  These
results are consistent with the notion that school-aged children in this population may
contribute importantly  to household resources: an extra sibling means that each child
can spend at least a little time at school. The point estimates for girls suggest that the
effect is somewhat less: each additional girl results in only a .5 year increase in the
average schooling of her siblings. 
There is, however, also evidence of the more tradeoff between the number and
schooling of children: given the current stock of school-aged children the MCH-FP
program (as measured by the treatment-year interaction) resulted in a .317 year
increase in average schooling in 1990. This result likely reflects the reduction in fertility
that is a result of the family planning services:  in contrast to a school-aged child who
7
can contribute importantly to household income, a pre-school child is likely to be a net
consumer of household resources  (see, e.g., Cain 1977), and therefore to keep older
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siblings at home rather than in school. This pattern is also likely reflected in the fact14
that girls appear to contribute less to the level of schooling: the issue is not necessarily
that girls contribute less to household resources but the fact that a household with
school-aged children that are girls are more likely to go on and have additional children
as reflected in the fertility decision rules.
Estimates of the fertility and education decision rules can then be used to obtain
estimates of the long-run effects of the introduction of a family planning program
through recursive substitution. By carrying out this substitution Foster and Roy (1990)
report that for a woman who experienced the family planning program over her
lifetime there would be an increase of 20% in mean schooling and a 30% decrase in
mean fertility.  The reason the long-run effect of the program on schooling is not much
different from its short-run effect is precisely that a reduction in the number of school
aged children results, ceteris paribus in a reduction in schooling.
C. Whose health affects schooling decisions? 
   The third example I will discuss involves the question of how to determine the
mechanism by which an experimentally introduced health program influences levels of
schooling. This example shares with the previous example the basic insight that a given
health program will influence schooling through a number of different channels: in
particular it may affect schooling through its effects on the health of adults (and thus
for example resource availability in the household), through changes in the health of
the school-aged children (and thus their ability to attend school), or through changes in
the health of preschool children (who might then be more likely to require childcare).
While it might be argued that it is sufficient to know that a health program affects
schooling without knowing the particular channel through which it operates, it might
nonetheless help one to determine how programs could be better designed to augment15
schooling. 
As Pitt and Rosenzweig (1988) point out assessment of the mechanism through
which access to health care affects decisions is difficult in circumstances in which the
price of health care varies similarly for all members of the household. The problem may
be thought of as one arising from a lack of sufficient instruments. Estimation of
decision rules such as equation (6) which condition on the health of various household
members must condition on the health of all household members--if, for example,  the
health of the father is left out of the decision rule, then the estimates of the effect of
the health of a son on his own schooling would also partly reflect the correlation
between the health of the son and the health of the father arising from the fact that
they face the same prices. However, if the health of all members is included in the
decision rule it is not clear, at least in the static case, what variables are ommitted from
the decision rule other than the price of health care. Thus in a household with 4
individuals (or 4 types of individuals) there would only be a single available instrument
(namely the price of health care). .
In a dynamic context such as that being discussed in this paper, this problem
can be dealt with because the human capital of the different individuals in a particular
period is affected by the full history of decisions made by the household. Net of the
current state variables (e.g., the health of each household member, the number and
composition of the household, and assets) this history does not influence current
decisions, thus the history may be used to construct instruments. Moreover, over a
relatively short period such as a number of seasons within the year for which
household composition and household assets are likely to be fixed, the primary source
of variation in the state variables will be seasonal variation in health: thus a fixed-effects16
instrumental variables  procedure looking at the effects of changes in health status on
changes in schooling decisions can be easily identified. 
The data used to illustrate this point come from stratified random panel of 448
farming households in Bukidnon in northern Mindanao, Philippines. These households
were interviewed in four rounds at four month intervals in 1984-85 as part of an
International Food Policy Research Institute study by Bouis and Haddad (1990). In
addition to detailed information in each round on illness, body size, and caloric intake,
there is information on whether these children attend school and if so, how much
school (if any) they missed school in the previous week. In the subsequent analysis we
use as a dependent variable of the decision rule the share of school time missed and as
a measure illness whether they reported themselves ill in the previous two weekss.
In order to accommodate variation in household size and structure individuals
were categorized into one of four age groups and the average illness within the age
group  was computed. Thus the primary state variables of interest are the mean levels
of illness by group; also the illness of the index child (i.e., the child whose school time is
used as the decision variable) is included separately to capture any potential effects of
own-illness on schooling arising from, say the inability to attend school, as opposed to
the more general effects of illness on resource availability. The level of missed school in
this population is high 21.7% of potential hours in school are missed on average in this
population. Illness was not especially high, however, with an average of .90 days in the
last two weeks spent ill; 10% of all adults were  were ill in the previous two week period.
The results are quite instructive: the primary effects of illness on missed school
operate through the health of the parent--while none of the other measures is
signficant, the estimates suggest that if the adults in a household are all ill there is a17
64.8% increase in the share of hours of school being missed. The implication is that the
effects of programs, to the extent that they influence the health of individuals,
primarily affect schooling through their effects on adult health. It appears that periodic
illness of parents may be an important factor resulting in sporadic attendance at
school. Unfortunately, the absence of changes in programs over the study period makes
it difficult to assess whether health programs themselves can in fact have an effect on
adult health, an issue that must be resolved before proper use can be made of the
above results.
IV Conclusion
In this paper I have presented three examples in which the estimation of
dynamic decision rules can importantly aid in the interpretation and understanding of
the effects of health and family planning programs on human capital investment.  My
purpose in doing so is not to argue that the kind of detailed household level data used
in this analysis can substitute for a quasi-experimental trial. The latter can provide
invaluable insight into the design and implemenation of programs that can only be
evaluated with great difficulty if at  all with data collected based on pre-existing
programs. Instead, my purpose is to suggest that policy makers be ecouraged to design
and implement experimental trials of various types of programs, but in the process to
be sure that sufficient resources are available to collect and link detailed household-
level information. These detailed data can importantly increase the nature of the
lessons that can be learned from the introduction of a carefully designed program
experiment.18
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Table 1
Logit and Fixed-Effect Logit Estimates of the Effects 
of the Treament Program on Infant Mortality







































Absolute asymptotic t-ratios based on Huber standard errors in parentheses
a21
Table 2
Instrumental Variables Fixed-Effects Estimates of 
Education and Fertility Decision Rules
(N=5567)





b .840 11.5 -.816 12.1
Girls 8-15
b -.330 2.98 .750 13.1
Children 15+ .706 5.56 -.841 4.86
Girls 15+ -.400 4.51 .760 9.15
Education 15+
b .201 4.33 -.089 2.82
Treat*1982 -.012 .148 -.276 3.26
Treat*1990 .317 2.40 -.453 2.29
Mother’s Age .384 1.34 -.571 2.74
1982 -2.37 2.33 1.89 4.87
1990 -4.05 2.03 3.84 5.21
Characteristics of child:
Male .412 3.02 -- --
Age -.137 .396 -- --
Age

























Absolute t-ratios based on Huber standard errors
a
Endogenous variable instrumented using initial period state variables, land ownership,
b
head’s education, and village-level characteristics22
Table 4









-.010 .062 -- --
Age
24+
.648 4.45 .458 5.10
Age
16-23
-.372 .844 -- --
Age
8-15
-.288 .619 -- --
Age 0-
8
.111 .368 -- --
Round 2 -.070 2.294 -.055 1.70









Absolute t-ratios derived from Huber standard errors
a
Endogenous variables, instrumented using program and wealth interacted with
b
round